Selection of the Jury by Needle, Gerald M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 7
1-1962
Selection of the Jury
Gerald M. Needle
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Gerald M. Needle, Selection of the Jury, 13 Hastings L.J. 495 (1962).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol13/iss4/7
SELECTION OF THE JURY
By GERALD M. NEEDLE*
W HO IS qualified to be a juror is clearly set out by statute.' Which
ones from the qualified body of the citizenry do get selected for jury
service, however, is not clearly set out by statute.2 The selection of the
jury list-the panel or array from which the individual jury is drawn-
rests largely on the sound discretion of trial courts and their officers.3
The soundness of their discretion has frequently been attacked as re-
sulting in a jury which is not impartial for not complying with the
"cross section of the community standard."4 What this standard means
and how far it is applied raises four main questions:
(1) To what groups in the community-social, economic, racial-
does the cross section standard apply? If to economic groups, for ex-
ample, what is the economic classification?
(2) What type of a showing must be made to bring about a re-
versal? Is mere non-compliance with the standard enough, or does
the complainant have to show prejudice? If prejudice must be shown,
does the complainant have to be a member of the excluded class?
(3) What differences are there in the application of the standard
between state and federal jurisdictions? May the Supreme Court re-
verse or review in either situation?
(4) Lastly, does the cross section standard mean there must be
proportional representation of all groups on the jury list? If so, does
it also mean proportional representation on the individual jury?
Racial Exclusion
Soon after the ratification of the fourteenth amendment, it was
determined that Negroes could not arbitrarily be excluded from jury
panels. Strauder v. West Virginia,5 involved a state law permitting
only white males to serve on juries. This obviously made it impossible
for a Negro male to sit on the jury. The Supreme Court, interpreting
the fourteenth amendment, found that this was a clear violation of the
"'equal protection of the laws" clause of that amendment.
128 U.S.C. § 1861 (1948); CAL. CODE Civ. Poc. § 198.
2 Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946); see statutes cited supra
note 1.
3 Ibid.
4E.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942).
5100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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The violation, however, need not be found in a statute.6 The Su-
preme Court in determining racial exclusion will inquire into the re-
sults of the selection by jury commissioners to see if they have discrimi-
nated against racial classes. Thus, in Smith v. Texas,7 the Court noted
that in a Texas county where there were thousands of qualified Ne-
groes, none had ever served on a grand jury. With this showing and
no more, the Court held that Negroes had been improperly excluded.
The effect, sometimes called the "rule of exclusion," is that upon a mere
showing of exclusion, a prima facie case of discrimination is estab-
lished. The state, then, must overcome this presumption by showing it
did not intentionally or systematically exclude the racial class.8 This
rule has been followed in other cases 9 and is the applicable rule in ra-
cial exclusion cases today. Smith v. Texas is also significant as being
the first case to state that a trial by jury "necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the community."10
Racial exclusion has most frequently arisen in cases involving Ne-
groes, but the rule of Smith v. Texas is by no means so restricted. In
similar situations, discrimination against Filipinos,
1 "non-Haolis,"12
and Mexicans13 has been proved. Presumably discrimination against
any identified racial group could be proved.
14
Attempts to interpret the cross section standard of Smith v. Texas
as giving a right to have all ethnic groups in the community proportion-
ally represented on the jury list have been rejected.' 5 Likewise, the
Court has not accepted the interpretation that an individual has a right
to have the members of his race proportionally represented on an in-
dividual jury.' 6 Many, however, do not consider the matter settled for
the issue of a proportional requirement is still frequently raised.' 7
Social and Economic Group Exclusion
A more recent question has arisen over whether the cross section
standard is applicable to exclusion of social and economic groups.
c Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (dictum that discrimination could be
by legislatures, courts, executive or administrative officers).
7311 U.S. 128 (1940).
8 See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 298 (1945) (presumption overcome).
9 Ross v. Texas, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1951); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
10 311 U.S. at 130.
11 International Longshoreman's Union v. Ackerman, 187 F.2d 860 (9th Cir. 1949).
12 Ibid; "non-Haolis" are, loosely in Hawaii, those other than the employer-entrepre-
neur group.
13 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
14 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (dictum).
15 Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286-87 (1951); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 403
(1945); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1879).
10 Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Norris
v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 590 (1935).
' E.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 82 S. Ct. 159 (1961).
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Although the point had been earlier raised, 18 the first case proving
economic discrimination was Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co.' 9 The plaintiff
brought suit in the superior court for San Francisco County whereupon
the defendant removed the case to the federal court on the grounds of
diversity of citizenship. The plaintiff sought damages for injuries al-
legedly caused by the defendant railroad's negligence. The plaintiff
in the district court moved to strike the jury panel on the grounds that
all daily wage earners had been purposely excluded from the jury list.
The clerk of the court and the jury commissioner admitted they had
excluded such persons to save the workers the inconvenience of coming
to court because the judges had always excused daily wage earners for
financial hardship. The district court denied the motion to strike the
panel and the circuit court of appeals affirmed a judgment for the
defendant.2 0 The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the
question of whether the motion to strike the jury panel was properly
denied. 21 The Court in a six-two decision reversed. In doing so it used
its non-constitutional ".... power of supervision over the administration
of justice in the federal courts."
22
The reason for reversal and the real evil involved in the selection
of jurors here was the non-compliance with the cross section of the
community standard.2 3 Mr. Justice Murphy in the majority opinion
stated, "The evil lies in the admitted wholesale exclusion of a large
class of wage earners in disregard of the high standards of jury selec-
tion. To reassert those standards, to guard against subtle undermining
of the jury system, requires a new trial by a jury drawn from a panel
properly and fairly chosen."
2
4
The majority held a showing of prejudice was not necessary for
reversal.25 If it can be assumed that exclusion of a class to which the
complainant belongs creates a greater likelihood of prejudice to him,
it should be noted that here, the petitioner was not a member of the
excluded class. Thus, the cross section standard as a requirement of
an impartial jury was separated from a showing of prejudice to the
individual appellant.
The concept of the cross section standard was further widened else-
where in the majority opinion when it was made clear that the Court
would as willingly have reversed if the exclusion had been of any other
Is Mamaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816 (6th Cir. 1920).
19 328 U.S. 217 (1946).
2o Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 149 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. granted 326 U.S.
716 (1946).
21326 U.S. 716 (1946).
22 328 U.S. at 225. See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
23 328 U.S. at 225; accord, Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
24 328 U.S. at 225.
25 Ibid.
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economic, social, racial, political or geographical group of the com-
munity.
26
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his dissent appeared to agree with the
majority that economic groups should not be intentionally excluded,T
but to reverse he would require that prejudice to the appellant be
shown as resulting from the exclusion.
28
Shortly after the decision in Thiel, the contention was made that
the decision meant there must be proportional representation of all
economic groups. If so, economic groups had to be classified. This
argument was advanced by counsel for defendants in United States
v. Local 36, Int'l Fisherman's Union.20 In support of his proposition
counsel employed a sociologist who contrived a chart breaking the
population down into twelve broad categories. Each category was to
have been proportionally represented on the jury panel. The practical
difficulties and the necessary inferences from such a classification can
be envisaged. As the district judge saw it: 30
To accept this breakdown as a reasonable classification as to economic
status would compel the conclusion that everybody listed [as] . . .
"Professional and Semi-professional workers," had the same viewpoint
and mental attitude towards life as every other one. It would compel
the court to say that a dancer (a chorus girl on Main Street perhaps)
had the same viewpoint and mental attitude towards life as a clergy-
man....
The district judge rejected both the idea of economic classification as
suggested and also rejected an interpretation of Thiel which would re-
quire proportional economic representation.
31
The Cross Section Standard in State Courts
Attempts within the states to apply the cross section standard of
Thiel have frequently failed.2 2 Thiel, having been decided on non-
constitutional grounds, is not a mandatory requirement on the state
courts. The sixth amendment requires an "impartial jury" in criminal
cases, but the sixth amendment was written by the Framers of the Con-
stitution to apply only to the federal courts. Its protection can be
extended to the states only if it can be brought within the "equal pro-
tection" clause of the fourteenth, or a violation of "due process" under
the fourteenth can be shown. Under the "equal protection" clause, the
26 Id. at 220.
27 Id at 229 (dissent).
28 Id. at 229-30.
29 70 F. Supp. 782 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
30 Id. at 789-90.
31 Id. at 796; see Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. at 220; cf. In re Shibuya Ju-
giro, 140 U.S. 291 (1891).
32 See State v. Neff, 169 Kans. 11, 218 P.2d 248 (1950); Rowland v. State, 218 Ark.
780, 213 S.W.2d 370 (1948); State v. Jones, 44 Del. 372, 57 A.2d 109 (1947).
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Supreme Court, from the time of Strauder v. West Virginia,33 has in-
quired into state jury compositions in the limited area of racial exclu-
sion. Would it not be unreasonable to suppose that the Court might
make the same inquiries into state jury compositions in the area of
economic exclusion?
Fay v. New York,3 4 a case on appeal from the New York Court of
Appeals, raised the issue. The Court, taking cognizance of the non-
constitutional grounds used to decide Thiel, refused to extend the
cross section standard of Thiel to state courts.3 5 The majority of the
Court distinguished the application of the cross section standard to
racial exclusion cases as compared with the application to economic
exclusion. In the former there was a federal statute involved 36 which
implemented the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment by expressly prohibiting the exclusion of jurors because of race
or color. There is no similar statute concerning economic exclusion,
hence, the Court concluded, the "equal protection" clause does not ex-
tend to cases involving economic exclusion .37
The remaining basis for bringing sixth amendment protection to
state courts would be under the "due process" clause of the fourteenth
which does not automatically bring Bill of Rights guarantees within
its scope.38 The result of the majority holding, then, is that, on a case-
by-case basis, challengers must prove that the effect of economic ex-
clusion in the selection of the jury list produced a trial ".... so unfair
as to amount to a taking of their liberty without due process of law."39
This requirement is in sharp contrast to Thiel which purports to give
blanket coverage to all criminal and civil cases in federal courts of a
cross section standard. There, on appeal, the challenger does not have
to show that the exclusion amounted to prejudice to him personally,
nor even show that he was a member of the excluded class. 40
A vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Murphy, who had written the
majority opinion in Thiel, said the cross section standard of Thiel
should be applied to state courts. 41 It may be assumed that Mr. Justice
Murphy maintained his position that the real evil is non-compliance
with high jury standards irrespective of prejudice to the individual
appellant.42 A defendant prosecuted by a state, as he stated it, "...
has a constitutional right to be tried by a jury fairly drawn by a cross
3 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
34332 U.S. 261 (1947) (5-4 decision), reh. den. 332 U.S. 784 (1947).
35 332 U.S. at 284, 287.
308 U.S.C. § 44 (1946), repealed and now covered by 18 U.S.C. § 243 (1948).
37 332 U.S. at 283.
38 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319
(1937).
39 332 U.S. at 296.
40 See text accompanying notes 25 and 26 supra.
41332 U.S. at 296 (dissent).
42 Id. at 297.
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section of the community."4 3 Moreover, he did not think Congressional
silence on the matter should prevent the Court from applying the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment whenever jury lists did
not measure up to the cross section standard.44 As precedence for such
a step, he pointed out: The court has ". . consistently interfered with
state procedure and state legislation when we felt that they were in-
consistent with the fourteenth amendment or with the federal com-
merce power despite Congressional silence on the matter...."45
California and the Cross Section Standard
California, as indicated in People v. White,46 follows the cross sec-
tion standard. The appellant in that case appealed a criminal convic-
tion to the California Supreme Court. His contention was that the
trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the entire jury panel
and that as a result he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by
an impartial jury. There was evidence to the effect that the jury com-
missioner, with an eye towards getting as many businessmen as pos-
sible to serve as jurors, had excluded hourly workers.4 7 The appellant
was an hourly worker. The standard for selection of jurors in Califor-
nia is pointed out by Mr. Justice Carter in his opinion: "Any system
or method of jury selection which fails to... encompass a cross section
of the community or which seeks to favor limited social or economic
classes, is not in keeping with the American tradition and will not be
condoned by this court.."48 Applying this standard to the jury in ques-
tion, the court found that it was "highly discriminatory and should not
be condoned," 49 but because of a state constitutional provision,"0 it was
necessary to find prejudice to the appellant to bring about a reversal.
Sufficient prejudice was not shown and the judgment was affirmed.51
Conclusion
The present state of the law, then, is that in federal courts, by the
authority of Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., the cross section standard must
be followed, and, in theory at least, there need be no showing of
prejudice to the individual appellant. In the state courts, by the Con-
stitution there is no method of jury selection mandatory on them except
that there must be no discriminatory exclusions amounting to a denial
of due process under the fourteenth amendment. This in turn is modi-
43 Id. at 298.
44 Id. at 297.
45 Id. at 297.
46 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 875 (1955).
47 Membership lists from various business and professional organizations extensively
used.
4843 Cal. 2d at 754, 278 P.2d at 18 (1954).
49 Id. at 753, 278 P.2d at 17.
0 CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 4.5.
51 Accord, People v. Hess, 104 Cal. App. 2d 642, 234 P.2d 65 (1951).
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fled by the well settled rule that any arbitrary exclusion of a racial
group will be unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. California follows the cross section stand-
ard but prejudicial error must be shown for a reversal.
Thus, within this rather broad framework, there is still a wide area
of discretion in the hands of the jury commissioners and other officers
of the courts who select the jury list. Suggestions that their discretion
should be more limited by enacting legislation setting up precise stand-
ards, ought to be rejected. To impose a precise standard of jury selec-
tion would pose enormous practical difficulties and greatly impede the
day-to-day task of selecting jurors. One reason is that there is no one
source of names available that would include all those qualified to
serve as jurors. Another practical difficulty would be that a precise
standard would undoubtedly require the categorizing of the popula-
tion into racial, social, economic, political, and geographical groups.
The groups overlap and any meaningful classification would be impos-
sible to make.
More important than any arguments of impracticability is the pol-
icy that lies back of the cross section standard or any other standard of
jury selection. It is that jury service is not a matter of classes. Com-
petent jurors are to be found on all levels of society. And if one accepts
the idea that jury service is an individual matter, there is little harm
in allowing, short of wholesale arbitrary exclusion, a wide discretion
to those who select the jury lists. The trial judge may still excuse jurors
for good cause and the trial lawyer in the voir dire may still challenge
those remaining. To accept the minority position in Fay v. New York
52
seems too severe. It would be quite unjust to reverse cases, perhaps
intrinsically sound, merely because an economic class was excluded.
It is better to make the appellant show prejudice before reversing,
than to have federal courts interfering, perhaps whimsically, with the
decisions of state courts. To do otherwise would, as Mr. Justice Frank-
furter put it in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., remind one of"... burning
the barn in order to roast the pig."53
52 332 U.S. 261 (1947) (dissent).
53 328 U.S. at 234 (dissent).
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